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are employed. I argue that, because of market incompleteness and private
information, the presence of this ﬁxed cost can generate multiplicity of equi-
librium. In particular there might be one equilibrium with high (female)
employment and low savings and another one with low employment and
high savings. The model suggests that aggregate saving and employment
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1 Introduction
The average household saving ratio over the last 30 years varies a lot across OECD
countries. There are persistent diﬀerences in private saving rates across very simi-
lar economies, which traditional models of capital accumulation have a hard time
explaining. This paper examines the impact of idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty
on aggregate saving and employment, through the saving behavior and labor sup-
ply decisions of families allowing for within household interaction of labor supply
choices. I model families as two member households, which exhibit prudence, and
therefore have a precautionary saving motive. On the other hand, I depart from
the traditional literature on precautionary savings and optimal inter-temporal con-
sumption behavior by allowing for endogenous labor supply decisions in both the
intensive and the extensive margin and I consider the general equilibrium implica-
tions of introducing within household heterogeneity.
I show analytically that if households are prudent the attachment of married women
to the labor force is increasing in the level of household earnings uncertainty. Next,
I examine the general equilibrium implications of the model for aggregate saving
and (female) employment. I show that the existence of a non-convexity, introduced
by the assumption that a family incurs a ﬁxed cost of participation when both mem-
bers of the household are simultaneously in the labor force, coupled with market
incompleteness and private information, can generate multiplicity of equilibrium.
In particular there might be one equilibrium with high (female) employment and
low savings and another one with low employment and high savings. Therefore, the
model predicts that aggregate saving and employment rates should be negatively
correlated across countries.
The recurring theme in models of inter-temporal consumption/savings decision is
consumption smoothing. Working more hours when productivity is low, to be
able to keep the same level of consumption, seems to be at least as eﬀective at
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smoothing consumption over time as engaging in precautionary savings, specially
in the presence of borrowing constraints. Thus prudent households might do labor
supply choices which are stirred by precautionary behavior. Moreover, my concern
about modeling households’ labor supply decisions, is driven by the drastic changes
in work hours composition which occurred in the US over the past 30 years. Thus,
McGratan and Rogerson (1998), report drastic reallocations of hours worked across
gender, age and marital status groups, despite the relative constancy of aggregate
work hours. I argue that this within family reallocations might be related to the
well documented increase in earnings uncertainty, particularly among male workers.
Therefore this paper is to a large extent motivated by the substantial increase
in female labor market participation which in the US paralleled the increase in
earnings uncertainty.
The corner-stone of this paper will be a model of family labor supply, which will
capture within household extensive and intensive margin labor supply interactions,
driven by precautionary behavior. In order to allow for both participation and
hours choices among household members, I follow Cho and Rogerson (1987) and
introduce within family labor supply decisions shaped by symmetric preferences
and ﬁxed costs of participation which are incurred when both members of the
household are simultaneously in the labor force. Moreover, I pose the problem
in such a way that female labor supply will act as a source of insurance against
within family earnings ﬂuctuations. This hypothesis has some empirical support.
For example, Dynarski and Gruber (1997) ﬁnd that families do a good job at
smoothing consumption in the face of changes in the head’s earnings. Moreover
they ﬁnd that a substantial amount of within family consumption smoothing is
achieved through oﬀsetting changes in other sources of family income, including
spousal earnings.
The bridge between the partial equilibrium and the general equilibrium model
is made through the labor market. In the general equilibrium model the wage
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diﬀerence across household members, interpreted as the gender wage gap, will be
made endogenous1. Because the value for the ﬁrm of hiring a worker will depend
on the attachment of the worker to the ﬁrm, ﬁrms will have to form rational
expectations about the degree of attachment of the worker to the labor force. Hence
the equilibrium employment rate will depend on the labor force exit rate of the
second household member, which will be endogenous in the rational expectations
general equilibrium.
Very few authors have investigated the interaction between earnings idiosyncratic
uncertainty and household labor supply and savings. Notable exceptions are Marcet,
Obiols-Homs and Weil (2003) and Pijoan-Mas (2004). These authors ﬁnd that in
a general equilibrium framework, and contrary to models with exogenous labor
supply, the presence of uninsurable labor income risk might lead to less aggregate
savings than under complete markets. Low (2004) analyses life cycle labor supply
and savings in a partial equilibrium framework. He ﬁnds that when labor supply is
ﬂexible, consumption is smoother than when work hours are exogenous because in-
dividuals can work more hours instead of giving up consumption. Furthermore, he
argues that making labor supply ﬂexible has an ambiguous impact on the correla-
tion between precautionary savings and earnings uncertainty, since on the one hand
the cost of accumulating precautionary balances will be smaller, but on the other
hand the value of precautionary wealth holdings will be less because households
can now adjust labor supply to smooth consumption.
In a paper closely related to ours, Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2005) study
the role of female labor supply as an insurance mechanism against idiosyncratic
earnings uncertainty in a life cycle model of savings and labor supply. They ﬁnd
that increasing uncertainty increases participation rates and that this eﬀect is larger
when the households face exogenous borrowing constraints. I will further explore
1Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) ﬁnd that small changes in the gender wage gap can
explain the increase in the average hours worked by married women.
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this hypothesis, providing both analytical and numerical results. I ﬁrst show, in a
partial equilibrium setting, that for prudent households the value of having both
members participating in the labor force is increasing in the level of uncertainty.
Next I study carefully the way within family labor supply adjustments and in
particular extensive margin adjustments by the second household member aﬀects
precautionary balances and employment in a dynamic general equilibrium model
with incomplete markets. The model suggests that a rise in equilibrium (female)
employment rates, which translates in an increase in the number of two-earner
families, should lead to a lower aggregate saving rate, as the variability of families
income decreases.
Therefore, the paper delivers both micro level predictions which arise from the par-
tial equilibrium analysis and aggregate implications. At the micro level, the model
predicts that households whose head is exposed to more earnings uncertainty are
more likely to have the second member of the family in the labor force. At the
aggregate level, the model predicts a negative correlation between female partici-
pation rates in the labor force and aggregate saving. I present empirical evidence
that supports both the partial and the general equilibrium predictions of the model.
In particular the micro level empirical investigation will be carried through using
household level data from the panel survey of income dynamics (PSID).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 solves a two period
partial equilibrium model which highlights the most important mechanisms I wish
to explore and delivers analytical results which will carry through to the dynamic
model. Next, in section 3, I model labor demand and I investigate a dynamic
general equilibrium model. In section 4, I solve numerically for the model stationary
competitive equilibrium. Finally, in section 5, I present relevant empirical ﬁndings
which support the model predictions and section 6 concludes.
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2 A Model of Saving and Family Labor Supply
I ﬁrst consider a two period model of savings and family labor supply which should
illustrate most of the mechanisms I want to study. A family is a partnership
between two members, a husband (m) and a wife (f), which make an integrated
choice over how much to consume and how many hours each member works in
period one and period two. To model the preferences of each household, I follow
Cho and Rogerson (1987) and in particular it is assumed that a family incurs a ﬁxed
cost of participation when both members of the household are simultaneously in
the labor force. The husband and the wife have identical and separable preferences
over consumption and labor supply, and household preferences are additive across
members. The instantaneous utility of each household is given by
u(cm) + u(cf) + g(m) + g(f)− φ (2.1)
where
φ =


0 if m × f = 0
Φ > 0 elsewhere
and u(c) is increasing, strictly concave, g ′() < 0 , g ′ ′() < 0 and g (0) = 0.
Moreover the following assumptions are made in order to establish the existence of
an interior solution
lim
c→0
u′ (c) = ∞ , lim
c→∞
u′ (c) = 0
lim
→0
g′ () = 0
The wage rate of the husband is normalized to one, and the wage rate of the wife
will be λ ≤ 1. λ, which will be made endogenous in the general equilibrium model of
section 3, should be interpreted as the gender wage gap. Both members are endowed
with one unit of time. Since the husband and the wife have identical preferences,
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the husband will always choose to participate in the labor force because of the wage
gender diﬀerential, however, the choice of the wife will depend on the size of the
ﬁxed cost Φ. Moreover, because preferences are identical the consumption level
chosen by both members will always be the same.
For simplicity I will assume that both the discount factor and the rate of return are
zero and thus abstract from inter-temporal substitution. Family chooses in each
period how much to consume and whether one or both members will be employed
as well as how many hours each member works. Given the assumptions made about
the existence of an interior solution, in the absence of the ﬁxed cost both members
of the household will choose to be employed. Finally, it is assumed that uncertainty
enters additively the budget constraint of the household through a mean µ random
variable  2.
The household solves the following problem
max
s,1m,1f
2u(c1) + g(1m) + g(1f)− φ1 + E [2u(c2) + g(2m) + g(2f)− φ2]
subject to


2c1 + s = 1m + λ1f
2c2 = s + 2m + λ2f + 
where s denotes savings, ci, i = {1, 2}, denote consumption in period one and
period two and ij , i = {1, 2}, j = {m, f}, are the period one and period two labor
supply of the husband and of the wife. Finally φi is the ﬁxed cost of participation
2The analytical results that follow do not depend on the assumption of separability in con-
sumption and leisure of the utility function, which was made for simplicity. However they do rely
on the assumption of additivity of uncertainty. The random component  should be interpreted
as a random component of earnings, independent of the choice of how many hours to work, made
by each household member, at the given wage rate. Thus when I develop the general equilib-
rium version of the model I will consider the labor supply of the ﬁrst member of the household
exogenous and thus the random component will be interpreted as a shock to his productivity.
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in the labor market by both members in period i, which is the only non-convexity
in this problem.
Assuming an interior solution (or equivalently neglecting the ﬁxed cost φ) and
setting λ = 1 for ease of exposure, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions to solve
this problem are
u′(c1) = E [u′(c2)] (2.2)
u′(c1) + g′(1j) = 0 (2.3)
E [u′(c2)] + E [g′(2j)] = 0 (2.4)
We want to investigate whether the choice to participate in the labor market by
the wife might be driven by precautionary behavior. For this to be true, I have to
show that the ﬁxed cost required to force a corner solution rather than the interior
solution is increasing in the level of uncertainty that the household is exposed to.
Let
(
s∗, ∗1m, 
∗
1f
)
be the optimal solution to the household problem in the absence
of the ﬁxed cost, and
(
s¯∗, ¯∗1m, 0
)
the constrained corner solution when a suﬃciently
large ﬁxed cost is introduced in period one. I wish to show that
EV
(
s∗, ∗1m, 
∗
1f
)− EV¯ (s¯∗, ¯∗1m, 0)
is increasing in the level of uncertainty, where EV (.) is the expected indirect utility
function in the absence of the ﬁxed cost, and EV¯ (. ) the constrained expected
indirect utility. I therefore require conditions under which the introduction of
uncertainty, or additional uncertainty through a zero mean spread, increases the
value for the household of participation of both members in the labor force. Because
the household choice is made over both the intensive and the extensive margin,
investigating the impact of uncertainty on the choice of 1f requires studying the
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impact of uncertainty over the two margins.
I ﬁrst study the intensive margin. That is, I require necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for the introduction of uncertainty about future wealth to increase the current
supply of labor in the absence of the ﬁxed cost. Notice that, in the absence of the
ﬁxed cost, ∗1m = 
∗
1f = 
∗
1 and 
∗
2m = 
∗
2f = 
∗
2. Let 
µ denote the level of labor
supply that would be chosen by both household members without the ﬁxed cost
and if there was no uncertainty. Given the ﬁrst order conditions, ∗1 ≥ µ if and
only if
E− µ = 0 ⇒ Eu′
(
s + 22 + 
2
)
≥ u′
(
s + 2µ + µ
2
)
(2.5)
A necessary and locally suﬃcient (small risks) condition can be found by applying
the diﬃdence theorem, developed by Gollier and Kimball (1996). For small risks,
(2.5) will hold if and only if
u′ ′ ′
(
s + 22 + 
2
)(
∂2
∂
+
1
2
)
≥ 0 (2.6)
and application of the implicit function theorem on the equilibrium condition
u′
(
s + 22 + 
2
)
+ g ′ (2) = 0 (2.7)
reveals that − 1
2
< ∂2
∂
< 0. This implies that (2.6) is equivalent to
u′ ′ ′ (c) ≥ 0 (2.8)
And I have shown that for a prudent household, for whom the third derivative
of the utility of consumption is positive, and in the absence of ﬁxed costs, the
current labor supply of both household members is increasing in the level of future
earnings uncertainty. Therefore the current household labor supply is driven by
precautionary behavior.
Lemma 1 For a prudent household for whom u′ ′ ′ (c) ≥ 0, the current supply of
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labor by both household members in the absence of the ﬁxed cost is increasing in
the level of uncertainty.
It follows that, if only the intensive margin mattered, an increase in earnings un-
certainty would increase the supply of labor by both household members. However
I still have to consider the extensive margin problem. Because of the presence of
a ﬁxed cost, the households will only choose to have both members employed in
period 1 if ∗1f ≥ L, where L is a threshold value deﬁned as
L : 2u
(
2L− s∗(L)
2
)
− 2u
(
¯∗1m − s¯∗
2
)
+ 2g (L)− g (¯∗1m)+ E [v (s∗, )− v (s¯∗, )] = Φ
where
v (s, ) = max
2m,2f
2u
(
s + 2m + 2f + 
2
)
+ g (2m) + g (2f )− φ
And the household will only choose to have both members employed if
f (∗1) = 2u
(
2∗1 − s∗
2
)
− 2u
(
¯∗1m − s¯∗
2
)
+ 2g (∗1)− g
(
¯∗1m
)
+ E [v (s
∗, )− v (s¯∗, )] ≥ Φ
Also, notice that f(∗1) is an increasing function of 
∗
1 because application of the
implicit function theorem on the equilibrium condition
u′
(
21 − s
2
)
+ g ′ (1) = 0 (2.9)
reveals that
ds
d1
= −u
′′ (21−s
2
)
+ g ′′ (1)
−1
2
u ′′
(
21−s
2
) > 0
It thus follows from Lemma (1), and from the observation that given concavity of
the indirect utility function
E [v (s
∗, )− v (s¯∗, )]
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is increasing in the level of uncertainty, that an increase in undesirable risk increases
the size of the ﬁxed cost needed to prevent the household from having both family
members employed. And I have shown that for a prudent household, for whom the
third derivative of the utility of consumption is positive, the value of participation of
both members in the labor force is increasing in the level of uncertainty. Therefore,
in this setup, the choice to participate in the labor force is driven by precautionary
behavior.
Proposition 1 For a prudent household for whom u′ ′ ′ (c) ≥ 0 the value of partic-
ipation of both members in the labor force is increasing in the level of uncertainty.
Finally, if I allow the household to have an initial endowment a0, the size of the
ﬁxed cost needed to prevent the second member of the household to take a job is
decreasing with the size of the initial endowment, because since ∗ is decreasing in
wealth, the cost of constraining the household second member not to participate
in a giving period will also be less if the household has a high initial endowment.
This is not surprising because when wealth increases the solution to the household
problem approaches the perfect foresight solution, and the impact of uncertainty
diminishes, and therefore also the cost of constraining the household second member
not to participate in the labor force is reduced.
Because wealth in the dynamic model, to be studied in the next section, is a
state variable, the introduction of non-convexities of the sort presented here will
give rise to households exhibiting non-monotone policy functions with important
implications for both inference on the strength of the precautionary motive and
aggregate saving as well as labor market equilibrium. Moreover, given that it
only depends on the properties of the perfect foresight indirect utility function,
our analysis carries through to the multiple period dynamic model, where the
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households problem has the following Bellman equation form3
V (a, ) = max
c,m,f∈Γ(a,)
{
2u (c) + g (m) + g (f)− φ + βE [V (a′, ′)]
}
In what follows I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model and investigate the
aggregate implications of the model in an economy characterized by incomplete
markets, and in particular I will make the gender wage gap λ and the female labor
force participation rate endogenous. Hence, I ﬁrst model the labor demand and
next characterize a stationary competitive equilibrium, which will be characterized
by an equilibrium wage gender gap and a stationary wealth distribution. The
key result of the general equilibrium model are that aggregate saving and female
employment are negatively correlated and that the gender wage gap will be less the
more attached women are to the labor force. Thus, the non-convexity introduced
by the ﬁxed cost coupled with market incompleteness and private information will
make possible the existence of multiple equilibrium. In particular there might be
one equilibrium with high participation of married women and low savings and
another one with low participation and high savings.
3 A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
3.1 Labor Demand
To characterize general equilibrium, we need ﬁrst to model the labor demand,
coupled with a zero proﬁts/free entry condition. I assume that labor is the only
factor of production and moreover that there are constant returns to scale. This
allows us to model a ﬁrm as a match between an employer and an employee. Firms
compete for workers a` la Bertrand and, given the equilibrium wage, workers choose
how many hours  to supply. In what follows I restrict the choice of  to be either 0
3In the dynamic model I will assume that β (1 + r) < 1, which implies that the household
asset holdings will endogenously be bounded from above.
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(non-participation) or 1 (participation). Moreover I assume that it will be always
optimal for the ﬁrst member of the household to supply one unit of labor. For this
to be true we require the following assumption
Assumption 1 Let V (a, ) be the household value function. Let a¯ = sup {a  A}
be the supremo of wealth holdings and ¯ the maximum of the support of the stochastic
component of earnings. If Φ is zero, then V f=1 (a¯ , ¯ ) > V f=0 (a¯ , ¯ ) and the
household will always choose to have both members employed.
Assumption (1) allows us to carry forward proposition (1) when we only allow for
extensive margin labor supply adjustments. There are no search frictions and no
barriers to entry. However, in this otherwise perfectly competitive market, when a
new match of a worker and a ﬁrm occurs, the marginal productivity of the worker
will be y− z and in the following periods and for as long as the match is kept, the
marginal productivity will be y. This can be interpreted as ﬁrm speciﬁc human
capital, which is entirely accumulated in the ﬁrst period of the match. The problem
of the ﬁrm is characterized by the following Bellman equations in discrete time
rJn = (y − z − ω) + (1− p)(Js − Jn) (3.1)
rJs = (y − ω) + p (Jn − Js) (3.2)
where Jn is the value for the ﬁrm of creating a vacancy and Js is the value for
the ﬁrm of remaining in operation with the same worker as in the period before.
The wage rate is given by ω and 0 < p < 1 is the probability of separation of the
match between the ﬁrm and the worker, which will be endogenous in the rational
expectations general equilibrium. From (3.1) and (3.2) we get
Js − Jn = × z
1 + r
and the value of a vacancy can be written as
rJn = 
(
y − p + r
1 + r
z − ω
)
(3.3)
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Finally, the free entry condition implies that in equilibrium Jn, the value of creating
a vacancy, must be zero and therefore the equilibrium wage rate will be
ω = y − p + r
1 + r
z (3.4)
In our economy there will be two wage rules, one for workers of type m and another
one for workers of type f because p , the probability of a match being destroyed,
will diﬀer according to the worker type. Because I have assumed that the ﬁrst
member of the household will always be part of the labor force, ﬁrms forming
rational expectations about p i, i = {m , f}, will set pm = 0. However, pf =
P ( ′ = 0 |  > 0) will not be zero. Since the decision of the second household on
the extensive margin is not a trivial one, because of the presence of the ﬁxed cost
φ, the ﬁrms will anticipate this when setting the wage rate. It follows that in
equilibrium, the wage gap across the two types (the gender wage gap) will be
λ =
ωf
ωm
=
y (1 + r)− pf − r
y (1 + r)− r
and if we set y = 1, we obtain
λ = 1− pf (3.5)
3.2 General Equilibrium
Characterization of a recursive competitive equilibrium for a dynamic heteroge-
neous agent model would require that we keep track of the wealth distribution be-
cause the equilibrium prices depend on the distribution of wealth and the forecast
of agents about future prices depends on the law of motion for wealth. However,
if the solution of the household’s problem at given constant prices induces a sta-
tionary distribution of wealth, then a stationary equilibrium exists, because in our
model economy there is no aggregate uncertainty and therefore, given a stationary
distribution of asset holdings, prices will be constant. Our deﬁnition of stationary
equilibrium is thus analogous to the one in Aiyagari (1994).
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1
Λ
1
pf
Figure 1: Determination of equilibrium λ and pf
I assume household asset holdings is private information which ﬁrms cannot ob-
serve. Hence, the rational expectations forecast of ﬁrms about pf will depend only
on the expectations about next period prices and on the equilibrium law of motion
of the wealth distribution. In the stationary equilibrium this will be time invariant.
Thus, let
z = (1 + r) a + 
be the predetermined component of households’ wealth and let z¯ (λ) be the thresh-
old level of wealth bellow which a household chooses to have both there members
employed at the given price. The rational expectation of ﬁrms about pf will be
pf =
∫ z¯(λ)
z
P [z′ ≥ z¯ (λ) | z < z¯ (λ)]× fλ (z) dz (3.6)
where fλ (z) is the stationary probability density function of z, which will depend
on λ. Moreover, z¯ (λ) is an increasing function of λ because the participation rate
is increasing in λ. On the households side, there is a continuum (measure one) of
two member families, indexed by i ∈ I , that have identical preferences but whose
earnings are subject to additive idiosyncratic shocks i. For simplicity, I assume
that the earnings idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d over time. Markets are incomplete,
and the only asset in this economy are privately owned bonds which earn a net
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return r, which will be kept exogenous throughout the analysis.
Households discount future utility at rate β and β (1 + r) < 1, which implies that
absent uncertainty they would want to borrow against future consumption to ﬁ-
nance current consumption. Moreover, I introduce an exogenous borrowing con-
straint4 by imposing ait ≥ 0 ∀ t. It follows that the optimization problem of the
household can be expressed as5
V (a, , λ) = max
c, lf
{
2 ln (c) + g (1) + g (f)− φ + βE [V (a′, ′, λ)]
}
subject to
a′ + 2c = (1 + r) a + ωm + λωmf + 
a′ ≥ 0
φ =


0 if f = 0
Φ > 0 elsewhere
A stationary competitive equilibrium relies on household behaving optimally given
there wealth and prices (ωm, λ), ﬁrms forming a rational expectation about pf and
a stationary wealth distribution Γ(a).
Definition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by the pair (λ, pf),
and a stationary wealth distribution Γ(a) which arises from
1. Households optimal decision rules: c∗ (a, ) , ∗f (a, ).
2. Free entry of ﬁrms.
3. Firms forming rational expectations about pf .
4Carroll (1992, 1997 and 2004) shows that households for whom the discount rate is greater
than the rate of return, that are prudent and that face possibly binding borrowing constraints
will have a target buﬀer level of wealth.
5I have chosen u to be logarithmic so that preferences be consistent with a balanced growth
path. No particular assumption was made for g because I focus on the extensive margin.
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Figure 4 illustrates a possible shape for the locus deﬁned by equation (3.6), which
I will call the pf -locus for ease of exposure. Notice that for low values of λ the
locus will not be deﬁned since no household will have both members employed. As
λ becomes larger, z¯ (λ) increases and therefore the unconditional probability of a
household having both members in the labor force increases. This suggests that the
pf -locus should be decreasing however it does not ensure it because ﬁrms compute
the probability conditional on the household being employed in the current period.
In fact no analytical characterization of the pf -locus is possible and therefore char-
acterization of the stationary competitive equilibrium will be a numerical exercise,
which I perform in the following section. The downward linear slope, which I will
call λ-locus corresponds to equation (3.5). Clearly there may exist more than one
equilibrium 6. In particular, I show through numerical simulation that for many
plausible parameterizations, two equilibriums will exist, one corresponding to a
low λ and a very weak female attachment to the labor force (high pf) and another
one with a very strong attachment and a high λ7. Finally, notice that Φ is a free
parameter which can be chosen in such way to always ensure the existence of an
equilibrium. Thus, because β (1 + r) < 1, the individual wealth holdings will be
bounded and the wealth distribution has ﬁnite support. In particular there exists
a z∗ (λ) such that for all z ≥ z∗ (λ), z ′ ≤ z∗ (λ) with probability one (Aiyagari
[1994]). The following existence result can therefore be established
Lemma 2 Given an appropriate choice of Φ, such that f (z
∗ (1)) = 1, there will
always exist an equilibrium with full labor force participation and a zero gender
wage gap, that is λ = 1.
Proof: if Φ is such that f (z
∗ (1)) = 1 then, because participation is decreasing in
6Strictly speaking a situation with pf = 1 and λ = 0 is a rational expectations equilibrium in
this economy however it is not an interesting one as it implies zero female labor supply.
7It is remarkable to notice that the two equilibriums obtained can be Pareto ranked. In
the equilibrium with high employment and low aggregate savings, ﬁrms are as well oﬀ as they
would be in the low employment high savings equilibrium, because of the free entry condition.
However, in the high employment equilibrium, households are better oﬀ because they solve the
same inter-temporal problem but facing a looser budget constraint.
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wealth, f (z
′ (1)) = 1 with probability one and hence the rational expectation of
pf will be zero and this will thus be an equilibrium.
In what follows I solve the model numerically and investigate the properties of
equilibrium through simulation over a sequence of λs.
4 Model Computation and Calibration
To characterize equilibrium numerically, assuming that a stationary wealth distri-
bution exists, we need to solve the household problem for a set of values for the
gender wage gap λ. I solve the dynamic programming problem of the household
by the method of discretization of the state space. The continuous process for the
stochastic component of income is replaced by a discrete markov chain following
Tauchen (1986). The household can hold a single asset at in discrete amounts cho-
sen from the set A, and the minimum amount is set to zero, as required by the
liquidity constraint assumption. The presence of an upper bound for wealth hold-
ings is an innocuous assumption given that β (1 + r) < 1 and hence the ergodic
wealth distribution will have ﬁnite support. The value function and the corre-
sponding policy rules are found through value function iteration, until convergence
is achieved8.
I next simulate an economy inhabited by a large number (N = 500) of households
over (T = 200) periods and compute the sample probability of an employed female
worker to exit the labor force. The same exercise is performed over a dense grid
8The value function iteration is performed on the “conditional value functions” corresponding
to each employment state. However, because of the presence of the ﬁxed cost φ, it is not possible
to rule out the existence of convex segments of the value function. As discussed in detail by Phelan
and Townsend (1991), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Lentz and Tranaes (2004) the solution
to the household problem can be improved through the introduction of fair lotteries, which will
only be part of the household optimal plan in the convex segments of the value function. The
role of this lotteries would be to ensure concavity of the value function. However, as suggested
by the literature mentioned above, the introduction of enough uncertainty allows to smooth away
convexities, hence ruling out the purchase of lotteries.
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Figure 2: Numerical determination of equilibrium λ and pf
of λs to ﬁnd the pf -locus. For λs not in the grid, the corresponding pf is found
through linear interpolation. To ﬁnd an equilibrium solution we must compute for
each λ the sample probability of a worker separation pˆf (λ) which corresponds to
pˆf (λ) =
∑T
t=T−k
∑N
i=1 I[ ift−1=1]
× I[ ift=0]∑T
t=T−k
∑N
i=1 I[ ift−1=1]
(4.1)
where k << T is chosen to be an integer number small enough to allow for con-
vergence of the wealth distribution and I corresponds to an indicator function.
Equation (4.1) is the numerical counterpart of equation (3.6). Next the equilib-
rium pair (λ, pf) is found by solving the equation
λ = 1− pˆf (λ) (4.2)
Figure 5 shows a numerical example, for which two equilibriums exist. Here, R
was 1.04, β was 0.95. As for the ﬁrms technology, y has been normalized to one
and z is 0.2, which implies that a worker is 20 percent less productive in the ﬁrst
period of the match. As λ increases and because the ergodic wealth distribution
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Female Employment
has ﬁnite support, we reach an equilibrium, for the chosen Φ (Φ = 0.25), where
everyone chooses to be part of the labor force. This in turn implies an equilibrium
λ equal to one, and there will be no discrimination in the labor market. Of course
this will not be the only possible equilibrium, as the pf -locus and the λ-locus cross
twice. There exists also an equilibrium with relatively low female attachment to
the labor force and a positive wage gender gap.
In such an equilibrium, there will be a positive hazard rate for matches involving
female workers and the wage gender gap will be given by this hazard rate. Figure
6 shows the equilibrium female employment rate which for the parametrization
chosen will be of 77%. The greater the participation rate the lower will be the
average marginal propensity to save. This is because the option value of holding
precautionary balances decreases when a household has both members employed.
Therefore there will be a negative correlation between aggregate saving and the
female participation rate. Finally, ﬁgure 7 shows the wealth distribution. It has
two diﬀerent modes because the households have diﬀerent buﬀer targets of savings
according to the employment status of the second member. Moreover, wealthier
households will not choose to have the second member employed and consquently
they will have a higher marginal propensity to save out of earnings. This is an
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interesting result, deserving further research, because it might provide a solution to
endogenously generate enough skewness of the wealth distribution 9, a phenomena
which is found in the data but that researchers working with this class of incomplete
market models have found very diﬃcult to replicate.
5 Some Empirical Evidence
The model introduced in this paper makes essentially two important predictions.
The ﬁrst one, which arises from the partial equilibrium component of the model,
is expressed in proposition (1), according to which the value of participation of
both members in the labor force is increasing in the level of uncertainty. We
would therefore expect that married couples for whom the head is exposed to
more earnings uncertainty should have more often the second member present in
the labor force. This prediction is of course testable using micro level data on
households. The second prediction of the model, which arises from the general
equilibrium considerations, is that the aggregate personal saving rate should be
greater in countries where female participation and employment is less.
9Chang and Kim (2006) examine the implication of within-household heterogeneity and family
labor supply choices for cross-sectional earnings and wealth distributions.
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5.1 Micro Level Evidence
To test the micro level predictions of the model we require information on married
male heads of household earnings and earnings volatility as well as information on
the within household employment choices. I wish to investigate the participation
behavior of married women and in particular the impact of the husband’s earnings
uncertainty as well as the household wealth on the likelihood of the wife being in
the labor force. The empirical investigation is performed on an eleven year (1981-
1991) longitudinal sample of continuously married couples from the panel study of
income dynamics (PSID).
5.1.1 The Household Level Data
The PSID is a longitudinal study of nearly 8000 US households, following the same
families and individuals since 1968. The initial sample was made of roughly 5000
households, 3000 being representative of the US population and about 2000 being
low-income families from the Survey of Economic Opportunities (SEO). Thereafter,
both the original households and their split oﬀs have been interviewed each year.
The survey includes a variety of socioeconomic variables, including age, education,
family structure and earnings. An important aspect of the PSID data is that
the earnings questions are retrospective. The interviews are conducted in March,
and the questions refer to earnings in the previous year. I date the observations
according to the year corresponding to the earnings, instead of the year of the
interview. Over our sample period, information about household wealth in the
PSID was collected in 1984 and 1989. Because of this limitation I exploit the full
sample to estimate the households head earnings uncertainty but just the 1989
cross-section to estimate a model of married women participation.
I have selected only continuously married couples whose household head was al-
ways part of the labor force in an attempt to match the concept of a household
introduced in the preceding sections. Individuals (both women and men) are con-
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sidered labor force participants if they report to be working, only temporarily
lade-oﬀ or unemployed and looking for work. Following Hyslop (1999), I have kept
both the random census subsample of families and the non random SEO subsam-
ple of families. Table 1 collects summary statistics on a group of relevant variables
corresponding to the 1989 cross-section. The variable labeled Head Avg Earnings
corresponds to 1981-1991 average earnings of the head. The sample is composed
of 1281 households.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Husband’s Age 42.814 8.561 27 75
Wife’s Age 40.738 8.419 25 74
% Participation 0.714 - 0 1
% Head Self-employed 0.184 - 0 1
# Children 1.529 1.229 0 6
# Children 1-2 0.108 0.33 0 2
# Children 3-5 0.191 0.43 0 2
# Children 6-13 0.887 0.934 0 5
Wealth (thousand $) 179.08 571.917 -224.77 14610
Head Avg Earnings (1981 thousand $) 25.602 21.98 1.814 374.593
5.1.2 Estimating Households Head Earnings Uncertainty
The most natural way to estimate household head earnings uncertainty was to ex-
ploit the 1981-1991 sample, and to estimate for each household head the volatility
of the innovations to earnings. The appropriate measure of earnings for our pur-
pose is total head labor income because I want to estimate labor market earnings
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uncertainty. We model the logarithm of earnings as an I(1) process
lnEt+1 = lnEt + ξt+1 (5.1)
The assumption that the logarithm of individual earnings has a unit root is one that
is very much accepted in the literature. Moreover, notice that this representation is
consistent with some sort of decomposition of the earnings process into a permanent
and a transitory component, which has been extensively exploited by the literature
(Meghir and Pistaferri [2004]). Finally, for each household, we take as a measure
of heads earnings uncertainty the standard deviation of ξ.
5.1.3 An Empirical Model of Married Women Participation
Hyslop (1999) reports that women who are employed are better educated, have
fewer dependent children and their husbands have a slightly lower income. More-
over participation is higher among black women. I obtain the same ﬁndings and,
moreover, I ﬁnd a positive correlation between the women likelihood to be on the la-
bor force and the husband earnings uncertainty measure. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that
household wealth has a negative impact on the probability of a married woman
being employed on a given year.
The econometric approach chosen is very simple. A probit speciﬁcation is used.
I estimate the model only on the 1989 cross-section. This way I do not worry
about the identiﬁcation of serial correlation and ﬁxed-eﬀects or other sources of
unobserved heterogeneity. I control for individuals education, household number
of dependent children, wife and husband age, individual race, husband occupation,
household US state of residence, individuals’ parents education and husband type
of employment (employee or self-employed). I introduce two variables which proxy
households head earnings uncertainty. The most important one is the volatility of
the innovations to the household earnings process, std(ξ), but the unemployment
rate in the household county of residence is also included. Table 2 shows the
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estimation results.
As predicted by the partial equilibrium model, both measures of uncertainty have
a positive impact on the likelihood of the wife being present in the labor force. And
more importantly households head earnings volatility is found to have a signiﬁcant
impact. As for wealth, we also do not reject that both the household wealth and
the head average earnings have a negative impact on married women participation.
This reﬂects the income eﬀect discussed in the literature but also is consistent with
a second order eﬀect corresponding to a decrease in precautionary labor supply
when wealth increases. The empirical ﬁndings are strongly consistent with the
micro level predictions of our model.
5.2 Aggregate Level Evidence
At the aggregate level, the prediction of our model is that there should be a neg-
ative correlation between an economy saving rate and female attachment to the
labor force. This is because the option value of accumulating precautionary wealth
balances is less when a household has both members employed. It follows that at
the aggregate level, the greater is female employment, the less will be aggregate
capital accumulation. This is a long run (steady state) prediction which is easily
testable using cross-country data provided by the OECD. Figure 6 plots household
personal saving rate against participation. The ﬁrst three panels correspond to the
70’s, 80’s and 90’s, respectively, and the last panel shows the plot corresponding
to the overall sample averages. A negative relation between personal saving and
female participation is evident. Table 4 reports the results for a single cross-section
of variables averaged over time (the between estimator). Once more the results
strongly support the predictions made by the model.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a heterogeneous agent dynamic general equilibrium
model which jointly models aggregate saving and (female) employment. I hope
that the paper will be a contribution towards explaining persistent diﬀerences in
private saving rates across very similar countries, which challenge the most well
established theories of saving.
I ﬁrst showed analytically, in a partial equilibrium setting, that if households are
prudent the attachment of married women to the labor force is increasing in the
level of household earnings uncertainty. Next I showed that in general equilibrium,
because of market incompleteness and private information and because ﬁrms are
not willing to pay the same wage to workers with diﬀerent degrees of attachment
to the labor force, allowing for family extensive margin labor supply choices can
lead to multiplicity of equilibrium. In particular we can have one equilibrium with
high employment and low savings and another one with low employment and high
savings. Furthermore, (female) employment and consequently the aggregate saving
rate will depend on the gender wage gap, a parameter which is made endogenous
in the general equilibrium model.
In the equilibrium with high employment and low aggregate savings, ﬁrms are as
well oﬀ as they would be in the low employment/high savings equilibrium, be-
cause of the free entry condition. However, in the high employment equilibrium,
households are better oﬀ because they solve the same inter-temporal problem but
wages are higher because of the lower gender wage gap. Therefore, the multiple
equilibriums can be Pareto ranked, and the paper thus oﬀers insights useful for
policy-makers.
The paper also delivers strong predictions which allows us to confront the model
with the data. In particular, at the micro level the model predicts that households
whose head is exposed to more earnings uncertainty are more likely to have the
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second member of the family in the labor force. At the aggregate level, the model
predicts that employment and aggregate saving will be negatively correlated. This
is because when equilibrium employment is higher, there will be a higher share
of two earners households in the economy, which are less exposed to earnings un-
certainty and therefore have lower saving rates. The empirical evidence presented
supports the predictions of the model.
An important direction for further research is to move beyond stationary compet-
itive equilibrium analysis and to examine the impact on aggregate ﬂuctuations of
market incompleteness in the setting described in this paper.
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Table 2: Estimation results: Probit
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
UNCERTAINTY : std (ξ) 0.322604† (0.191687)
WEALTH -0.000194† (0.000111)
PERMANENT EARNINGS -0.013813∗∗ (0.004257)
COUNTY UNEMPLOYMENT 0.003488 (0.003225)
AGE 0.097289 (0.087071)
AGE2 -0.001842† (0.000943)
AGE (husband) -0.020648 (0.084504)
AGE2 (husband) 0.000695 (0.000893)
# KIDS < 18 -0.006154 (0.066872)
# KIDS 1-2 -0.382039∗ (0.183417)
# KIDS 3-5 -0.758033∗∗ (0.140102)
# KIDS 6-13 -0.291627† (0.152038)
EDUCATION 0.249400∗∗ (0.039987)
EDUCATION MOTHER -0.067489∗ (0.032287)
EDUCATION FATHER -0.011770 (0.028194)
BLACK 0.521363∗∗ (0.153252)
NATIVE AMERICAN 1.262693∗ (0.600524)
ASIAN -0.291472 (0.492749)
OTHER 0.559110 (0.588861)
NO DISABILITY 0.058195† (0.032758)
EMPLOYEE (husband) 0.266075† (0.144206)
UNION (husband) -0.019417 (0.130579)
N 1281
Log-likelihood -629.82828
χ2(73) 207.245686
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
The specification includes an intercept, dummy variables for husbands occupation and household US state
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Table 3: Savings and female participation across OECD countries (1970-1999 average)
Personal Saving Female Participation
AUS 10.05 55.6
AUT 11.12 53.2
BEL 16.75 49.3
CAN 12.13 59.6
CHE 10.69 61.3
DNK 0.34 71.3
FIL 3.28 69.6
FR 13.33 55.8
GBR 8.60 60.5
GER 12.42 55.0
IRL 9.41 40.5
ITL 19.37 41.6
JAP 16.36 57.5
KOR 17.60 47.9
NED 5.93 46.8
NOR 2.71 64.2
PT 10.83 59.4
SP 11.01 37.6
SWE 5.65 73.5
US 7.93 62.2
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Figure 5: Participation and Aggregate Saving
Table 4: Between Estimator (full sample)
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
PARTICIPATION -0.294∗∗ (0.085)
CONSTANT 27.329∗∗ (4.969)
N 514
Countries 20
R2 0.4
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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